Metaphysical Defense for the Rationality of Science

Abstract

 David Hume challenges the very scientific method of induction. There are also many thinkers who believe that we cannot have pure reason to choose between two competing theories. Kuhn, Duhem and Quine contend that pure reason alone would never tell us to choose the better theory from two rival theories. Others also think that it is not rational to claim to have only one legitimate method for the practice of science. For example, Paul Feyerabend is known to have argued that science should be questioned and rejected for claiming and demanding to have one definite method to pursue its goals. He rather insisted on the idea that there is no single method – a position he expresses via a dictum “anything goes.” And all these are mainly epistemological responses to the challenges of the rationality of science. This paper, however, shows that the epistemological responses are not sufficient to question or support the rationality of science and argues that this endeavor must be grounded in metaphysical principles. The argument draws on David M. Craig’s discussion of foundational metaphysical tenets alongside Carl Gustav Hempel’s tacit recognition of metaphysical assumptions for scientific explanations to work