Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and Withdrawing African Nations

Impediment on the Enforcement of Human Rights

Abstract

nternational  Criminal Court  (henceforth  the  ICC)  is  primarily  founded  to  end  or  curb impunity for perpetrators of core crimes by introducing universal jurisdiction and thereby  brings  about  respect  for  the  fundamental  human  rights  recognized  under  various international and regional human rights instruments. However, some African nations are  blaming the Court for targeting Africans by disregarding similar instances. Consequently,  some African nations, including Republic of South Africa, Gambia, and Kenya are tabling 
withdrawal from their treaty obligations under the Rome Statute. Moreover, the African Union  (AU) is resisting the Court on the justifications of selective enforcement and immunity of sitting heads of State. But withdrawing from the Rome Statute cannot allow African nations to evade accountability at the international level because the values of human rights have attained jus cogens norms (jus cogens norms are peremptory norms that must be respected whether a nation is a ratifying or not to a certain treaty). Added to this, Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the obligation of withdrawing nations will continue despite questions of withdrawal. This article, therefore, argues that the accountability of African nations will continue intact despite various questions of withdrawal taking into account the nature of human rights treaties.  This will be done by exploring relevant literature, legal framework under the Rome Statute and decisions of the Court. In the end, the article concludes that African states should cooperate with the ICC in the enforcement of human rights rather than asking to withdraw from the Rome Statute.